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Volume 12, Number 12—December 2006

Research

Evaluating Detection of an Inhalational Anthrax Outbreak

David L. Buckeridge*Comments to Author , Douglas K. Owens†‡, Paul Switzer‡, John Frank§, and Mark A. Musen‡
Author affiliations: *McGill University, Montreal, Quebec, Canada; †Veterans Affairs Palo Alto Health Care System, Palo Alto, California, USA; ‡Stanford University, Stanford, California, USA; §University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario, Canada

Main Article

Table 3

Sensitivity, time to outbreak detection (timeliness), proportion of outbreaks detected through syndromic surveillance before clinical case finding, and mean detection benefit of syndromic surveillance compared with clinical case finding for 3 release scenarios and 2 levels of specificity*

Amount released (kg) Specificity 0.900 (1 false alarm every 10 d)
Specificity 0.975 (1 false alarm every 40 d)
Sensitivity per outbreak Mean timeliness, d Proportion with detection benefit Mean detection benefit, d Sensitivity per outbreak Mean timeliness, d Proportion with detection benefit Mean detection benefit (d)
1 1.00 3.1 (0, 5) 0.59 1.0 (0, 3.3) 0.98 4.3 (2, 7) 0.28 0.32 (0, 1.0)
0.1 0.99 3.3 (0, 6) 0.55 1.0 (0, 3.5) 0.95 4.7 (2, 7) 0.24 0.33 (0, 1.1)
0.01 0.94 3.6 (0, 7) 0.51 1.1 (0, 3.7) 0.82 5.1 (2, 8) 0.19 0.33 (0, 1.3)

*Values in parentheses are 10th and 90th percentiles of the distribution.

*Values in parentheses are 10th and 90th percentiles of the distribution.

*Values in parentheses are 10th and 90th percentiles of the distribution.

Main Article

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