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Volume 3, Number 2—June 1997

Perspective

The Economic Impact of a Bioterrorist Attack: Are Prevention and Postattack Intervention Programs Justifiable?

Arnold F. Kaufmann, Martin I. MeltzerComments to Author , and George P. Schmid
Author affiliations: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA

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Table 4

The maximum annual actuarially fair premiuma by reduction in probability of event and size of avoided loss: Anthrax

Actuarially fair annual premium ($ millions)
Days post-attackb Preventable loss ($millions) 0.01
t0
0.001 0.01
to
0.0001 0.01
to
0.00001
Maximum loss estimatec
0 22,370.5 201.3 221.5 223.5
1 20,129.4 181.2 199.3 201.1
2 15,881.5 142.9 157.2 158.7
3 8,448.0 76.0 83.6 84.4
4 4,200.1 37.8 41.6 42.0
5 2,076.1 18.7 20.6 20.7
6 1,013.8 9.1 10.0 10.1
Minimum loss estimated
0 14,372.4 128.9 141.8 143.1
1 12,820.1 115.4 126.9 128.1
2 10,049.1 90.4 99.5 100.4
3 5,200.1 46.8 51.5 51.9
4 2,429.7 21.9 24.1 24.3
5 1,004.2 9.4 10.3 10.4
6 351.2 3.2 3.5 3.5

aSee text for definition.
bNo. of days from attack to effective initiation of prophylaxis.
cMaximum loss preventable (potential net savings) occurs with the doxycycline-anthrax vaccine prophylaxis regimen, a multiplication factor of 5 for unnecessary prophylaxis, and a discount rate of 3% (Table 2).
dMinimum loss preventable (potential net savings) occurs with the ciprofloxacin prophylaxis regimen, a multiplication factor of 15 for unnecessary prophylaxis, and a discount rate of 5% (Table 2).

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