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Volume 10, Number 7—July 2004
Perspective

Estimating Time and Size of Bioterror Attack

Johan Walden* and Edward H. Kaplan*†Comments to Author 
Author affiliations: *Yale School of Management, New Haven, Connecticut, USA; †Yale School of Medicine, New Haven, Connecticut, USA

Main Article

Figure 1

Simulated actual (open dots) and forecasted (solid curve) cumulative cases in an anthrax bioterror attack that infects 100 persons 1.8 days before the first symptomatic case is observed. The cases were simulated from a lognormal distribution with median 11 days and dispersion 2.04 days, which corresponds to the incubation time estimated for anthrax based on the Swerdlovsk outbreak (3).

Figure 1. . Simulated actual (open dots) and forecasted (solid curve) cumulative cases in an anthrax bioterror attack that infects 100 persons 1.8 days before the first symptomatic case is observed. The cases were simulated from a lognormal distribution with median 11 days and dispersion 2.04 days, which corresponds to the incubation time estimated for anthrax based on the Swerdlovsk outbreak (3).

Main Article

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Page updated: April 23, 2012
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