Volume 16, Number 1—January 2010
Synopsis
Laboratory Surge Response to Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Outbreak, New York City Metropolitan Area, USA
James M. Crawford, Robert Stallone, Fan Zhang, Mary Gerolimatos, Diamanto D. Korologos, Carolyn Sweetapple, Marcella de Geronimo, Yosef Dlugacz, Donna M. Armellino, and Christine C. Ginocchio
Table
Lessons learned during clinical laboratory response to pandemic (H1N1) 2009, New York City metropolitan area, USA, April 24–May 15, 2009*
| The following were critical to an effective laboratory response: |
|---|
| 1. Early assessment and decisive and immediate response by management to laboratory needs |
| Includes needs related to staffing, supplies, the LIS, physical plant, client relations, and local and state reporting requirements |
| 2. Management of staffing needs |
| Plans for immediate cross-coverage by trained technical and nontechnical staff |
| 3. Coordination of system general laboratories |
| Standardization of testing algorithms and prioritization of courier delivery to central clinical virology and Molecular Diagnostics Laboratories |
| 4. Enhanced reporting |
| Verification of LIS operations for patient-based reporting |
| Communication to treating physicians |
| Daily epidemiology reports for System leadership, Infection Control, and hospital administrations |
| Daily contact with local civic health officials |
| 5. Enhanced client services |
| Increase number of staff to communicate results and respond to incoming calls, including scripted responses to frequently-asked questions |
| Maintenance by sales staff of specimen-collection supplies and communication of guidelines for specimen procurement and testing to outreach physician practices |
| 6. Public relations oversight |
| Communications to news agencies were restricted to the System’s public relations office |
*LIS, Laboratory Information Systems; System, North Shore–Long Island Jewish Health System.
Page created: March 31, 2011
Page updated: March 31, 2011
Page reviewed: March 31, 2011
The conclusions, findings, and opinions expressed by authors contributing to this journal do not necessarily reflect the official position of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, the Public Health Service, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, or the authors' affiliated institutions. Use of trade names is for identification only and does not imply endorsement by any of the groups named above.