Skip directly to site content Skip directly to page options Skip directly to A-Z link Skip directly to A-Z link Skip directly to A-Z link
Volume 12, Number 11—November 2006
Research

Targeted Social Distancing Designs for Pandemic Influenza

Robert J. Glass*Comments to Author , Laura M. Glass†, Walter E. Beyeler*, and H. Jason Min*
Author affiliations: *Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico, USA; †Albuquerque Public High School, Albuquerque, New Mexico, USA

Main Article

Table 5

Mitigated case average attack rates (%) for increasing ID and base case, variation 1, variation 2, and variations 1 and 2 combined*

No. Strategy combination
Base case ID factor
Variation 2 ID factor
Variation 1 ID factor
Variations 1 and 2 ID factor
S CTsd AOAsd LL Wsd 1 1.25 1.5 2 1 1.25 1.5 2 1 1.25 1.5 2 1 1.25 1.5 2
1 51 66 75 86 52 68 78 88 52 70 80 90 52 70 80 90
2 Wsd 48 63 72 84 41 60 71 83 47 66 77 88 35 58 72 86
3 LL 41 57 67 79 37 57 68 82 36 57 70 84 28 55 69 84
4 LL Wsd 39 55 65 78 30 49 62 77 30 53 67 82 12 42 60 78
5 AOAsd 38 51 59 70 40 58 68 79 25 46 58 72 33 56 69 80
6 AOAsd Wsd 35 48 56 66 30 47 58 71 18 39 51 66 9 37 53 71
7 AOAsd LL 32 46 55 66 28 48 60 73 13 36 50 67 11 40 57 74
8 AOAsd LL Wsd 30 43 52 63 21 40 51 66 10 32 46 62 4 23 42 64
9 CTsd 41 58 69 82 45 64 75 86 41 63 76 88 46 67 78 88
10 CTsd Wsd 37 55 66 79 31 53 66 80 32 57 71 85 21 52 67 83
11 CTsd LL 29 48 60 75 26 50 64 78 20 47 63 80 19 49 65 81
12 CTsd LL Wsd 27 45 57 72 16 40 55 72 14 41 58 77 6 32 53 74
13 CTsd AOAsd 29 46 56 68 34 55 66 78 15 40 54 70 27 54 67 79
14 CTsd AOAsd Wsd 26 42 52 64 20 41 54 69 9 31 45 63 5 30 50 69
15 CTsd AOAsd LL 22 39 51 64 18 42 56 72 7 29 45 64 7 35 55 73
16 CTsd AOAsd LL Wsd 20 37 48 61 10 32 47 63 5 22 39 58 3 16 37 61
17 S 41 61 73 85 45 66 77 87 47 68 79 90 51 69 80 90
18 S Wsd 36 57 70 83 30 54 68 83 38 62 75 88 29 56 71 85
19 S LL 23 47 62 78 23 49 65 80 20 50 66 83 22 51 67 83
20 S LL Wsd 19 44 59 76 9 38 55 74 13 44 62 80 6 35 55 76
21 S AOAsd 26 47 59 74 34 56 69 81 16 44 60 76 34 58 70 82
22 S AOAsd Wsd 20 41 55 70 14 41 57 73 8 35 52 71 7 36 55 74
23 S AOAsd LL 11 35 51 68 12 40 57 74 5 28 48 69 8 38 57 75
24 S AOAsd LL Wsd 9 32 47 65 5 27 45 66 4 20 41 64 3 14 39 65
25 S CTsd 4 26 50 73 15 47 64 80 12 46 64 82 34 58 71 84
26 S CTsd Wsd 3 15 40 68 3 21 46 71 5 32 55 78 6 36 56 77
27 S CTsd LL 2 7 29 60 3 21 45 70 3 17 43 70 5 33 54 75
28 S CTsd LL Wsd 2 6 20 54 2 6 24 57 2 9 31 64 2 9 33 64
29 S CTsd AOAsd 2 4 13 44 4 24 48 70 2 4 15 49 8 37 56 73
30 S CTsd AOAsd Wsd 2 3 7 30 2 5 16 49 2 3 6 28 2 5 20 54
31 S CTsd AOAsd LL 2 3 9 34 2 7 27 58 2 3 7 36 3 11 35 63
32 S CTsd AOAsd LL Wsd 2 3 6 25 2 3 8 37 2 2 5 20 2 3 9 39

*Variation 2 is an increase in work group frequency of contact to give all children, teenagers, and adults the same overall contact frequencies; variation 1 is removal of relative infectivity and susceptibility. ID, disease infectivity; S, school closure; CTsd, children and teenagers social distancing; AOAsd, adults and older adults social distancing; LL, liberal leave; Wsd, work social distancing. Shaded numbers denote strategy combinations that reduce the attack rate to <10% of the population (illness attack rate <5%). Average attack rates accumulate over only those simulations that resulted in epidemics (>100 infected). Average standard deviation across the entire set of simulations was 2.2% with a maximum of 7.6%.

*Variation 2 is an increase in work group frequency of contact to give all children, teenagers, and adults the same overall contact frequencies; variation 1 is removal of relative infectivity and susceptibility. ID, disease infectivity; S, school closure; CTsd, children and teenagers social distancing; AOAsd, adults and older adults social distancing; LL, liberal leave; Wsd, work social distancing. Shaded numbers denote strategy combinations that reduce the attack rate to <10% of the population (illness attack rate <5%). Average attack rates accumulate over only those simulations that resulted in epidemics (>100 infected). Average standard deviation across the entire set of simulations was 2.2% with a maximum of 7.6%.

Main Article

Page created: October 14, 2011
Page updated: October 14, 2011
Page reviewed: October 14, 2011
The conclusions, findings, and opinions expressed by authors contributing to this journal do not necessarily reflect the official position of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, the Public Health Service, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, or the authors' affiliated institutions. Use of trade names is for identification only and does not imply endorsement by any of the groups named above.
file_external