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Volume 25, Number 6—June 2019
Research

Sequential Emergence and Wide Spread of Neutralization Escape Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus Mutants, South Korea, 2015

Yeon-Sook Kim1, Abdimadiyeva Aigerim1, Uni Park1, Yuri Kim, Ji-Young Rhee, Jae-Phil Choi, Wan Beom Park, Sang Won Park, Yeonjae Kim, Dong-Gyun Lim, Kyung-Soo Inn, Eung-Soo Hwang, Myung-Sik Choi, and Nam-Hyuk Cho2Comments to Author 
Author affiliations: Chungnam National University School of Medicine, Daejeon, South Korea (Y.-S. Kim); Seoul National University College of Medicine, Seoul, South Korea (A. Aigerim, U. Park, Y. Kim, W.B. Park, S.W. Park, E.-S. Hwang, M.-S. Choi, N.-H. Cho); Dankook University College of Medicine, Cheonan, South Korea (J.-Y. Rhee); Seoul Medical Center, Seoul (J.-P. Choi); National Medical Center, Seoul (Y. Kim, D.-G. Lim, H.S. Shin); Kyung Hee University, Seoul (K.-S. Inn); Seoul National University Medical Research Center and Bundang Hospital, Seoul (N.H. Cho)

Main Article

Figure 1

Emergence and spread of Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) bearing the I529T or D510G mutation in the spike protein during the 2015 outbreak in South Korea. Transmission chain of infection and the timeline of potential virus exposure, symptom onset, date of specimen collection from patients, and identified mutation in the spike protein of MERS-CoV analyzed in this study. Case-patients’ IDs are colored on the basis of disease severity (gray, group I; black, group II; pink: gr

Figure 1. Emergence and spread of Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) bearing the I529T or D510G mutation in the spike protein during the 2015 outbreak in South Korea. Transmission chain of infection and the timeline of potential virus exposure, symptom onset, date of specimen collection from patients, and identified mutation in the spike protein of MERS-CoV analyzed in this study. Case-patients’ IDs are colored on the basis of disease severity (gray, group I; black, group II; pink: group III; red, group IV). Spike sequences analyzed by targeted deep sequencing (10) are denoted as a square with black (single genotype) or red (mixed genotypes with wild-type) borderline. Others are marked as circles (direct sequencing). Detailed information on patients’ characteristics and their associated spike sequences of MERS-CoV are available in Appendix Table 1 and 2). WT, wild-type.

Main Article

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Main Article

1These first authors contributed equally to this article.

2These authors were co-principal investigators.

Page created: May 20, 2019
Page updated: May 20, 2019
Page reviewed: May 20, 2019
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